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Where the Good Signatures Are:
The Number and Validity Rates of Initiative Petition Signatures Gathered
In California Counties
Abstract
One of the biggest hurdles to qualifying an initiative for the ballot is gathering the re-
quired number of signatures. Yet little is known about these signatures’ representativeness
or demographic origin. Using data from eight recent California initiatives, we study the
distribution of signatures across counties. We then conduct regression analysis to study how
characteristics of counties relate to the number of signatures gathered there. Besides the
source of petition signatures, we also study the results of checks performed by county offi-
cials on these signatures to determine whether there are sufficient valid signatures (i.e., from
registered voters) in order to qualify the petition for the ballot. We then conduct regression
analysis of validity rates by county. Our findings indicate that a variety of social and politi-
cal factors influence both the number and validity rate of signatures across counties, though
the results are more consistent for the former. Finally, we demonstrate that signature gath-
ering campaigns have consequences for outcomes by relating the intensity of the signature
campaign within a county to ballot roll-off.
1 Introduction
The process of direct legislation provides citizens and organized interests the opportunity to
submit legislation directly to a state’s voters rather than attempt to persuade the legislature
to enact it for them. The process has seen a resurgence in use and attention over the last
quarter century, particularly in the last decade or so. As the frequency of use has increased,
so has the amount of scholarly and popular attention. The majority of this attention has
been in three areas: the initiative process’ consequences for state policy outcomes, whether
it infringes on minority rights and whether voters are sufficiently informed to make direct
policy decisions. Less attention has been paid to the process whereby initiatives qualify for
the ballot. Further, almost all of the studies of the qualification process are legal studies,
case-study analyses or are descriptive studies based on interviews. In this paper we study
one of the more important aspects of the initiative qualification process: signature gathering.
To see the importance of qualification hurdles, consider the fact that since adopting the
initiative process in 1911, California has had 1,187 initiatives titled for circulation. Of those,
only 290 (25%) have reached the ballot (Shelley 2002). This discrepancy is certainly caused
by many factors, including legal issues, legislative action and lack of resources, but gathering
the necessary signatures is often considered the greatest hurdle in successfully qualifying
an initiative. Across the twenty-four states with some form of direct legislation, signature
requirements vary from four to fifteen percent of votes cast in the previous election. This
produces great disparities in the number of signatures required per state; while California
has one of the lower percentage requirements at five percent for statutory and eight percent
for constitutional initiatives, this translates into almost half a million and two-thirds of a
million signatures, respectively.
This vast number of signatures required has led critics to proclaim that qualifying an
initiative is not a test of public support, but a test of the depth of its supporters’ pockets.
Ballot access, it follows, has effectively been restricted to large and wealthy groups rather
than the grassroots movements that Populist and Progressive reformers envisioned availing
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themselves of the process. While there is still debate about whether broad-based interests
have been sidelined from the process, it is clear that it takes a significant amount of money
to place measures on the ballot.1 It is often said that an individual or group can place any
measure on the California ballot if they are willing to spend a million dollars, though costs
can increase when many petitions are circulating and time is running out.
Another way in which reformers have proposed placing new controls on the initiative
process is by imposing geographic distribution requirements on the signatures required to
get a proposal onto an election ballot. Forcing proposal proponents to get signatures from
every county in a state, or to obtain some minimal threshold of signatures from every county,
could increase the costs of proposing a measure for the ballot.2 Also, it could help insure
that proposals that make it to the ballot have widespread geographic support in a state.
Despite a number of studies and government inquiries into the initiative process that
have generated a general understanding of how signature gathering is organized and how
the validation process works, there is no work that we know of that analyzes the source and
validity of actual signatures.3 What type of people sign petitions? Do signature gatherers
tend to focus their efforts on specific counties? Are certain types of voters or counties
more likely to produce invalid signatures? How do petition campaigns influence individual
behavior and ballot outcomes? Would a geographic distribution requirement have an impact
on the number and type of ballot measures that qualify for an election ballot?
These questions are important for a variety of reasons. First and foremost among them is
the need to develop an ever-better understanding of one of the most crucial, costly parts of
an increasingly important component of political activity in dozens of states. Vast sums of
money are spent in many states (like California) in the attempt to qualify measures for the
ballot, and there is now an industry that works on signature gathering for political groups and
candidates; Ellis (2003) compares the signature gathering process for initiatives to primaries
for candidates. Studying how the signature gathering process works is therefore critical for
producing a better understanding of the politics of the initiative process. Beyond a need to
understand process, however, it is also important to understand how specific steps in the
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process affect its accessibility to different interests in society. Since the initiative process is
used by citizen groups that are often under-represented among those that typically lobby the
legislature (Gerber 1999), whether and how the signature gathering process restricts ballot
access vis-a-vis traditional groups is an important component for understanding the effect
of the initiative process on representation. If it is easier to gather signatures from certain
types of voters then it becomes possible that issues associated with certain interests may
qualify for the ballot more easily. Similarly, the issue of signature validation is also important
since if signatures from certain types of voters or from specific counties are less likely to be
valid, then there will again be consequences for which issues reach the ballot. In addition,
systematic invalidation of signatures from specific voters may undermine their equality of
representation.
We address these questions in this paper by analyzing signatures gathered for eight
California initiative petitions that made it to the ballot between 2000 and 2003. We obtained
county-level reports from the Secretary of State’s Office that include the total number of
signatures gathered, the number of signatures verified and the number that were valid. We
use these data to study variation in the number of signatures gathered per county as well
as variation in the validity of signatures per county. We also analyze the distribution of
signatures relative to population. We then conduct regression analysis using models for
event count data that allow us to relate county characteristics to the number of signatures
gathered as well as to the validity rate. Our results indicate that a variety of social and
political variables influence both the number of validity of signatures gathered. Lastly, we
provide evidence that signature gathering campaigns matter for outcomes by regressing roll-
off rates on the intensity of signature gathering in a county.
2 The Signature Gathering Process
To satisfy the demand for placing measures on the ballot, an entire industry arose in Cali-
fornia to manage all stages of initiative campaigns. Estimates put the total number of firms
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involved in the initiative process at nearly one hundred, almost all of which are located in
California (McCuan, Bowler, Donovan and Fernandez 1998). The number of firms involved
in signature gathering is much smaller, with about a half dozen full-time firms in California
(McCuan, Bowler, Donovan and Fernandez 1998). The largest firms are Kimball Petition
Management and National Petition Management; smaller firms include American Petition
Consultants, National Voter Outreach, Masterton and Wright, and Progressive Campaigns
(Broder 2000).
The existence of an initiative consulting industry is not a recent phenomenon, however.
Almost immediately after the adoption of direct legislation provisions in California in 1911,
temporary consultants began to spring up to assist campaigns. While attempting to qualify
a referendum in 1912, dairymen reportedly paid ten cents a signature to gather 23,000
signatures (Goebel 2002); a more typical rate at the time was about five cents per signature,
corresponding to around 80 cents today (Ellis 2003). The first full-time permanent firm,
Whitaker and Baxter’s Campaigns Inc., was established in 1930 and handled five or six
initiatives per election (McCuan, Bowler, Donovan and Fernandez 1998). Very early on,
many states responded to the role of professional circulators by banning their use.4
Today, these petition management firms typically hire independent contractors, often
on a regional basis, to gather signatures. Contractors typically make five to twenty cents
per signature. These “crew chiefs” then hire individuals to actually circulate the petitions,
paying anywhere from twenty-five to fifty cents per signature (Broder 2000; McCuan, Bowler,
Donovan and Fernandez 1998). On a good day, a petition circulator can make fifty to eighty
dollars an hour; even more when time is running out and groups are desperate to qualify
their measure.
While the intent of Progressive reformers may have been to generate public discussion of
issues during the signature gathering process, it rarely works that way. Petition circulators
usually approach individuals in high-traffic areas, such as shopping malls, and ask them
if they are registered to vote and, if so, to sign their petitions. People who ask for more
information about the issue are generally offered a one or two sentence summary of the
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proposal or are asked to step aside as they read the petition. If someone is not sure how
they feel about the measure, circulators often appeal to democratic instincts by asking to
them to sign so the proposal can get on the ballot for the people to decide. There is little
incentive for circulators to spend time explaining the measure when most people who are
approached will sign with little prompting — between half and three-quarters of individuals
sign without reading the petition (Cronin 1989).5.
In a potentially extreme, but oft-cited example of the signature gathering process, Ed
Koupal describes what he refers to as the “hoopla process”:
First, you set up a table with six petitions taped to it, and a sign in front that
says, SIGN HERE. One person sits at the table. Another person stands in
front. That’s all you need — two people.
While one person sits at the table, the other walks up to people and asks two
questions. We operate on the old selling maxim that two yeses make a sale.
First, we ask them if they are registered in that county. If they say yes to that,
we immediately push them up to the table where the person sitting points to a
petition and says, “Sign this.” By this time, the person feels, “Oh goodie, I get
to play,” and signs it. If the table doesn’t get 80 signatures an hour using this
method, it’s moved the next day.6
At least in part because of similar portrayals of the signature gathering process, states
have attempted to regulate it more strictly. In hope of reducing the relationship between
money and ballot access, the most widely adopted approach has been to ban the use of paid
signature gatherers. Yet the Supreme Court has ruled in Meyer v. Grant [486 U.S. 414
(1988)] that such bans violate the First Amendment and that there is not a sufficient state
interest in regulating the process to reduce fraud to warrant such an infringement (Ellis 2003;
Lowenstein and Stern 1989; Tolbert, Lowenstein and Donovan 1998).7 Colorado responded
to this decision by requiring petition circulators to wear name badges, but the Court also
ruled that a violation. The closest states have come so far is to require them to wear badges
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or that say “volunteer” or “paid” signature gatherer or that they are registered to vote in
that state.
In California – the state that is the subject of our study – there are two types of initiative
measures that are required to be signed by a certain number of registered voters: initiative
statutes and initiative constitutional amendments.8 Initiative statutes are measures that
would amend California statute, and require signatures equivalent to 5% or more of the
votes cast for all candidates in the previous gubernatorial election.9 Initiative constitutional
amendments seek to amend the state constitution and require signatures equivalent to at
least 8% of the votes cast for all candidates in the past gubernatorial election. Unlike some
other initiative states, California has no distribution requirement that requires a certain
share of signatures to originate in a fixed number of counties.10 California does, however,
have one of the shortest signature-gathering periods, allowing only one hundred and fifty
days from the date the petition is titled to gather the required number of signatures.
After the signed petitions are submitted to the state, there are a variety of procedures
for checking if there are sufficient valid signatures from registered voters to qualify the
measure. Most states check either all of the submitted signatures or a random sample. In
California, county officials check three percent of signatures submitted in their county, with
a five hundred signature minimum.11 Each official then projects the expected number of
valid signatures in their county and reports the result to the Secretary of State’s office.12
Once all counties have reported, the projected statewide total number of valid signatures
is calculated. If the number of estimated valid signatures is greater than 110% of the total
number required, the initiative qualifies for the ballot; if the number is less than 95% of that
required, it is rejected. When the total falls between these two points, counties conduct a
full verification of all signatures submitted.
States vary somewhat in their definition of valid signatures as well. Except for North
Dakota (which has no voter registration), signatures must come from registered voters. In
California, voters are required to list their address as well. If the address does not match the
one listed with their voter registration, the signature may be deemed invalid. In Colorado,
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signatures have been invalidated if voters names do not match exactly what is on the regis-
tration rolls (Tolbert, Lowenstein and Donovan 1998). Other states invalidate petitions that
have stray marks on them, including coffee stains. Because a certain number of signatures
will fail to meet the potentially stringent validity requirements, firms tend to “overqualify”
their petitions, gathering up to 175% of the number actually required.
3 The Distribution of Total and Invalid Signatures
To study the types of characteristics that make counties more attractive for gathering sig-
natures and whether there is systematic variation in the validity rate of those signatures,
we obtained data on eight petitions from the California Secretary and State’s office. These
data include the following information for each petition and each county: the number of
signatures gathered, the number of signatures sampled, and the number of valid signatures
in the sample.13 In addition, two of these potential initiatives were projected to have total
signatures within the 95-110% range of the number required for qualification, triggering a
full check of all signatures. We analyze the number of invalid signatures from the full checks
separately from the initial random sample checks.
The potential ballot measures that we have data on all had sufficient signatures to reach
the ballot; some were overqualified by wide margins while one just barely made it. Further,
four of our measures are constitutional amendments and needed to gather signatures equal
to eight percent of gubernatorial turnout rather than the five percent required for statutory
initiatives. We provide basic information about each of the eight petition signature efforts
in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
The measures involved cover a wide array of issues, over a range of election cycles. Three
of the measures in our database were on the general election ballot in the 2000 presidential
election. Petition number 830, which was Proposition 35 on the ballot, covered state public
works projects and issues associated with the use of private contracts for those projects: this
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passed with 55.2% of the votes cast in this election. Also in the 2000 general election were
petition 656 (on the ballot as Proposition 36) and petition 874 (Proposition 37). The former
dealt with drug treatment programs, and passed with 60.9% of votes cast; the latter would
have lowered the vote threshold for passage of new taxes, and this measure failed to pass,
with only 47.9% of votes cast supporting passage.
One of the petition measures we have data on was on the 2002 primary election ballot:
petition number 918, which became Proposition 45 on the spring primary ballot. This
measure would have altered the term limits law for legislators in California, and it was
defeated after receiving 42.3% of votes cast. From the 2002 general election we have data on
three measures: 935, 936, and 952. Measure 935 was renumbered to be Proposition 51 on
the ballot, regarding the distribution of transportation taxes, and it received only 42.2% of
yes votes and failed to pass. Measure 936 became Proposition 52, an initiative that would
have changed voter registration laws to usher in election day registration in California; this
measure also failed to pass, gathering only 40.9% of yes votes. Last on the ballot in the 2002
general election was Proposition 49, which had been circulated for signatures as measure
952. This measure provided new funding for before and after school programs, and it passed
after receiving yes votes from 56.7% of voters.
The last measure in our database was 933, which was placed on the October 2003
statewide recall ballot as Proposition 54. This measure would have barred the state from
collecting racial and ethnic data, but it failed to pass with only 36.1% of voters casting
ballots in support of passage.
Next, we present descriptive statistics for each initiative in Table 2. The total number of
signatures for the four statutory measures ranges from 713,849 to 784,984. This represents
significant overqualification since only 419,260 signatures were needed to meet the five per-
cent threshold. The constitutional initiatives needed about 670,816 signatures; the four in
our sample had between 957,370 and 1,089,042 signatures. While this represents an average
overqualification of seventy-five percent for the statutory and fifty percent for the constitu-
tional proposals, it is still the case that one of each type had a sufficiently low validity rate
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in the random sample check that full counts were triggered.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
More specifically, we find that for all of the ballot measures we have data on, signatures
collected were 162% more than required. There is not an enormous amount of variability
in the overqualification percentages across each measure, with a low of 143% (measure 187)
and a high of 187% (measure 952). This suggests that signature gathering campaigns aim
for a target of over 150% of necessary signatures.
Turning now to the county level, we find that each petition had signatures gathered from
every county, with the exception of one measure (952) for which no signatures were submitted
in Alpine county. This is interesting in light of the fact that California has no distribution
requirements that force circulators to gather a minimum number from a fixed number of
counties.14 The number of signatures gathered does vary widely, however, with twenty-six
instances of counties with ten or fewer signatures in our sample. At the other extreme is Los
Angeles County with over a third of a million signatures gathered for one petition and an
average of 210,000 for the statutory initiatives and 276,000 for the constitutional initiatives.
The only other counties that break six digits are San Diego (three times) and Orange (once).
The average number is around 17,600 for constitutional initiatives and 12,800 for statutory
proposals.
Yet despite this wide disparity in the number of signatures gathered per county, the
overall distribution is surprisingly equitable. To determine this we constructed two variables
— one that measures the proportion of a petition’s signatures gathered in a county and a
second that measures the proportion of Californians living in the same county. These two
variables have a correlation of 0.97 and a regression of the former on the latter produces a
constant of zero and a coefficient of 0.999.15 This indicates an almost perfectly equitable
distribution of signatures across counties relative to their size. It also suggests that the
imposition of a distribution requirement would only distort the signature gathering process
and that large areas such as Los Angeles and San Diego are not overrepresented in terms of
determining what makes it to the ballot.
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Using our data, we can investigate whether a distribution requirement would have any
effect on whether the eight initiatives in our study would have reached the ballot. Since Cal-
ifornia does not have a distribution requirement we can not say exactly what would happen,
but we can see how stringent a requirement would have to be to keep our initiatives from
qualifying. Since we have county data and since the majority of distribution requirements
are county-based, we focus on this type of requirement. Using data for the vote in the 1998
gubernatorial race, we can calculate the number of counties in which the statewide signature
threshhold was met or exceeded. For statutory initiatives this means counting the number of
counties where the number of signatures obtained exceed five percent of the county’s turnout
in the 1998 governor’s race; for constitutional initiatives we use an eight percent threshhold.
These calculations indicate that it would take a strict distribution requirement to disqualify
these initiatives, particularly statutory ones. The four statutory proposals met the thresh-
hold in twenty-eight to thirty-four of the fifty-eight counties; constitutional proposals did so
in twenty-two to thirty counties. Except for Nevada and Wyoming, county-based require-
ments are generally for half the counties or fewer (and often involve percentage less than
the statewide requirement). Given that our petitions met the requirement in about half the
counties without even trying, a low or moderate requirement would probably not inhibit
qualification.
An alternate way to interpret how equitably signatures are distributed across counties is
to calculate a Gini index for the number of signatures per capita in each county. Gini indices
are commonly used as a measure of inequality and vary from zero (perfect equality) to one
(perfect inequality); they provide us a way to make comparisons between initiatives. The
Gini indices for our eight initiatives are included in our table and vary from 0.38 for petitions
830 and 952 to 0.50 for petition 865. To put these values in perspective, they are about the
same as those for the distribution of income across U.S. households. In combination with the
correlation and coefficients discussed in the previous paragraph, these results suggest that
while, on average, signatures are gathered equitably from across counties, there is significant
variation across counties of similar size.
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In terms of validity, there is wide variation in the proportion of submitted signatures
that are determined to be valid during the random sample validation.16 Overall, our seven
random sample checks indicate an average validity rate of 78%.17 Ignoring cases with ten or
fewer signatures, the validity rate varies from fifty-nine percent to ninety-six percent, with
an average of seventy-eight percent.18 In addition, there is little difference in the validity rate
of constitutional and statutory initiatives. This suggests that petition managers’ strategy
of gathering extra signatures is well justified (albeit based on our sample of successfully
qualified petitions) and that almost one third extra signatures is needed just to average the
minimum required.19
Examining the two cases where validation was performed on all the signatures, we find a
75.5% validity rate, slightly below the validity rate for the random sample tests. This is not
due to differences between the proposals in the two samples, either: for the one measure that
we have both random and full sample validation, the validity rates are 78.3% and 75.6%,
respectively. The difference is highly statistically significant.20
These results provide an interesting view of the signature gathering process in California,
suggesting that signatures are gathered rather equitably from among the fifty-eight counties
and that the overall validity rate of these signatures does not vary much at the aggregate
level. Yet there is considerable variation across initiatives in terms of the absolute and per
capita distributions across counties; there is also considerable variation across counties in
the validity rate. Our next task is to explore whether these variations are systematically
related to political and social characteristics of the counties.
4 Signature and Validity Rates By County
In this section we study the signature gathering process and the strategies employed by
petition managers by determining whether they focus on certain counties. It is also important
to study how social and demographic factors relate to signature gathering as this is the most
important and expensive hurdle to getting issues on the ballot. Following the analysis of
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the number of signatures gathered per county, we study how the same factors relate to
the validity of signatures gathered. In particular, we are interested in whether there exists
systematic variation in validity rates across counties. Lastly, we link petition campaigns
to individual behavior by relating the intensity of signature gathering campaigns within a
county to ballot roll-off rates on the same measure.
The objective of petition managers is generally straightforward: gather signatures suf-
ficient to qualify specific petitions for the ballot. As a business, we should expect them to
do so as cheaply as possible, subject to the necessity of gathering enough valid signatures
to surpass the qualification threshold. Petition managers therefore face a potential trade-off
between paying more to gather fewer high-quality signatures and paying less for more low-
quality signatures. High-quality signatures have a greater chance of being valid and should
therefore be worth more from a business perspective. There is evidence of this trade-off in our
data: the number of signatures gathered in a county is negatively, though weakly, correlated
with the validity rate of those signatures and the validity rate for constitutional proposals,
which require 60% more signatures, is one percent lower than for statutory proposals.
This logic is also consistent with statements from signature gatherers, who emphasize
their strategy of going to locations with lots of people: “The most effective version of this
technique is for a single circulator to work long, slow-moving lines of people waiting to get
into a movie, play, concert or other event.”21 Or, in the words of Ellis: “The key variable is
not the attitude of those who sign the petition .... the key variable is the number of people
who can be solicited” (Ellis 2003). While opportunities of this sort exist in any county,
we expect that petition managers will focus their efforts on high density counties and test
this by including a variable Population Density that measures the number of people per
square mile in each county. We expect that denser counties should produce more signatures,
but that they should have greater invalidity rates. Additionally, we control for a county’s
Total Population and expect it to increase the number of signatures, but also to increase the
invalidity rate.
To control for social and economic characteristics, we include measures of race, age,
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education, unemployment and income. For some of these variables, we have no specific
expectation regarding their effect on the number of signatures, though they may have a
specific effect on validity rates. In general, we expect validity rates to be lower in areas
where there is greater mobility since one would expect that to increase the chance that a
voter’s current address is out of date with that listed on the official registration rolls. In
addition, areas with younger, poorer citizens may produce signatures from people who are
less likely to be registered at all. Thus we would expect greater Median County Age, greater
Per Capita Income, greater percent of the population with a High School Education and
lower Unemployment Rates to be associated with lower shares of invalid signatures.
Lastly, we also include measures of political characteristics, including partisanship and
competitiveness. Partisanship, measured with the Democratic Vote Share in the 2002 gu-
bernatorial election, may have a different effect for specific initiatives since the issue content
of a proposal may help determine which areas petition managers target. Of course given
the wisdom that the vast majority of signers do not read the petition, partisanship may not
have a large effect. There may also be an indirect effect of issue content since some initia-
tive consultant and petition management firms tend to specialize in issues associated with
a specific ideological perspective (McCuan, Bowler, Donovan and Fernandez 1998). If firms
tend to focus on certain geographic areas and certain issues are more likely to be taken to
certain firms, then this could produce a partisan effect as well. Of course, signature gatherers
generally carry multiple petitions at once, so this effect is probably muted.
Competition may matter because of its relationship to overall political activity. Further,
since competition is generally thought to be associated with greater levels of political fraud,
we might expect more competitive counties to produce more invalid signatures.22 Wemeasure
competition with the Margin in the Governor’s Race — the absolute value of the difference
between the Republican and Democratic vote shares in the 2002 gubernatorial election.
Taking these factors into account, we estimate models for the number of signatures gath-
ered in each county and then for the proportion of invalid signatures in each county. Validity
rates are analyzed separately for the seven random samples and the two full samples. We
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also estimate separate models for each initiative.
Because our dependent variable is the number of signatures gathered in a county, we
employ models for event count data. Event count models such as Poisson and negative
binomial regression are superior to linear regression models for these type of data. The
difference is particularly important for our analysis since we have many counties that produce
very small numbers of signatures; linear regression models have been shown to produce biased
coefficients (King 1989a). While the negative binomial and Poisson models are quite similar,
the Poisson suffers from the limitation that it assumes that the variance is equal to the
mean (E[Y ] = V ar[Y ]). The negative binomial relaxes this assumption by allowing for
overdispersion, which permits the variance to be greater than the mean. When this is the
case, the Poisson parameter estimates are correct, but the standard errors are incorrect
(King 1989b).23
Overdispersion is caused by two phenomena: contagion and heterogeneity. Contagion
would occur if the gathering of one signature in a county increases the chances of another
signature being gathered in the same county during the same time period. Since signatures
are gathered by individuals attempting to gather as many signatures as possible, it seems
quite likely that contagion exists. Heterogeneity would arise if different voters within a
county have different probabilities of signing a petition or if different signatures gathered
within the same county have different probabilities of being deemed invalid. Both of these
seem likely as well. Thus we expect our data to exhibit strong overdispersion and estimate
negative binomial regression models.
4.1 Total Signatures
The analysis of the number of signatures gathered per county is presented in Table 3. Overall
the results indicate that a variety of factors influence how many signatures are gathered per
county. In addition, the models greatly increase our ability to explain the data, as evidenced
by the small p values associated with the χ2 statistics for explanatory power. The results
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are very consistent across the eight initiatives in terms of the direction of the effect as well
as the significance of the different independent variables. Because of this consistency, we
discuss only the overall patterns rather than focus on the effects for individual initiatives.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Our expectations about the strategies of signature gatherers are borne out by the data.
More signatures are gathered from larger counties and more signatures are gathered from
denser counties. Both of these variables are significant at the five percent level or better in
every model. To obtain a better understanding of the substantive impact of these variables
on the number of signatures gathered per county, we calculate first differences for each
independent variable. These marginal effects represent the change in the dependent variable
resulting from an increase in each independent variable from one standard deviation below
its mean to one standard deviation above its mean, holding all other independent variable
constant at their mean values. These results are presented in the top panel of Table 4. The
calculations indicate that changes in population have a slightly greater effect than changes
in density: population has a marginal effect of 6,222 whereas density has a marginal effect
of 4,260.24 Recall that the average number of signatures per county is about 15,000.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
There are also important effects for our social and demographic variables. We find that
counties with a greater median age produce significantly fewer signatures, both in the pooled
regression and for five of the eight separate petitions. The marginal effect is around six thou-
sand for statutory measures and eight thousand for constitutional initiatives. At the same
time, counties with greater per capita income produce significantly more signatures, with
a first difference of almost 4,700. Some of the other social and demographic variables pro-
duced more mixed or non-existent results: the percent of the county’s voting age population
that has a high school degree does not affect the number of signatures gathered, while the
unemployment rate has a negative effect that is significant for only two of the eight measures.
In terms of racial characteristics, we find that counties with a greater proportion of blacks
yield more signatures, though we find no relationship between the proportion of Hispanic
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voters and the number of signatures. The first differences indicate that the former has an
effect of 4,532 signatures in the pooled model.
Lastly, turning to our political factors, we find effects of both partisanship and competi-
tiveness. Counties that exhibited greater support for the Democratic candidate in the 2002
gubernatorial election produce significantly fewer signatures; the coefficients are all signifi-
cant except for the last three statutory proposals. Interestingly, the direction of the effect is
consistent across initiatives, suggesting that circulators do not seek out ideologically sympa-
thetic voters. Competitiveness produces more signatures — when the margin of victory is
greater, significantly fewer signatures are gathered from that county. Overall, partisanship
has the third largest largest impact on the number of signatures gathered (almost 6,000)
whereas margin’s 4,600 signature effect puts it right in the middle. For the four constitu-
tional proposals, the marginal effect of partisanship lies between two-thirds and three-fourths
of the average number of signatures per county.
4.2 Signature Validity
We now turn to our analysis of the validity rate of the signatures gathered in each county.
We perform joint and separate analyses for each initiative for which we have random sample
results as well as for the two initiatives for which we have full validation results. Our
dependent variable in these analyses is the number of invalid signatures in each county. Of
course, this number is heavily dependent on the number of signatures checked in each county.
Fortunately, event count models can accommodate variation in the maximum number of
possible events, commonly referred to as exposure, across units. This is accomplished by
including the natural logarithm of the number of signatures checked as an independent
variable. If the coefficient on this variable is constrained to one, the model is equivalent to
estimation of the percent valid in a county. Rather than impose this constraint, however, we
follow the recommendations of Maddala (1983) and King (1989b) to estimate a coefficient
for this variable.25
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The results for the seven random samples are presented in Table 5.26 The results are not
as striking as for the number of signatures gathered, but there are some interesting findings.27
The most consistent variable is unemployment — counties with greater unemployment rates
have a significantly higher rate of invalid signatures.28 This finding obtains in the overall
results as well as in six of the seven individual initiatives. The marginal effects reported
in the second panel of Table 4 indicate that the first difference effect for unemployment is
about twenty signatures. Given that the average number of invalid signatures in the random
samples is almost 144, this represents about a 14% change. The percent of a county that
is black has a positive and significant effect in two of the initiatives and in the combined
model. The marginal effect is about four signatures.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
Less consistent results obtain for population and density. The effect of population on the
number of invalid signatures is positive for five of the seven initiatives, but only one of these
five coefficients is significant. This is consistent with our expectation based on the incentives
for signature gatherers. Yet the effect is negative in both and significant in one of the other
cases, which is contrary to our expectation. Population density also produces positive and
negative effects, though the two significant cases are positive. This is more consistent with
our expectation about the trade-off between signature volume and signature quality. The
marginal effects for these two variables are relatively small, however.
Most of the other variables produce no systematic results. Partisanship and is general
positive, but never significant whereas margin is mostly negative but never significant. Age
is negative and significant in two of the seven initiatives as well as in the pooled results;
the marginal effects in these two cases are -16 and -24, respectively. Finally, education is
significant and positive in two cases and per capita income is never significant.
The results for the two full checks are presented in Table 6. For the initiative that is
included in the previous table, the results are similar in terms of patterns of significance,
though age and population swap significance. For the one initiative that we do not have
random sample results for, there is mixed evidence for our expectations regarding population
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size and density effects — both are significant at the 0.01 level, though population is again
found to have a negative effect. Unemployment also has significant effects, though only the
0.10 level. Overall, the full sample tests appear to produce results similar to the random
sample tests, though they provide additional evidence for some of the variables that had
mixed results.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
4.3 Consequences of Signature Gathering for Outcomes
What is the political relevance of the signature gathering process for ballot outcomes? Be-
sides the obvious necessity of gathering signatures to meet qualification hurdles, the signature
gathering process may have consequences for individuals’ voting and participation decisions.
For example, the Progressive ideal of citizen debate on specific proposals would be for sig-
nature gathering to generate broader discussion of the merits of ballot measures. As voters
are confronted with petitions to sign they become interested in the topic and seek to be-
come more informed about the proposal and potential alternatives. This may lead to a more
informed and politically active electorate, which might be more likely to have well-formed
opinions on ballot measures and may be more likely to express those opinions by voting. In
fact, there is already evidence that direct legislation states have greater political participa-
tion (Boehmke 2002; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003
Smith 2001) and possibly more informed voters (Tolbert, McNeal and Smith 2003).
Given these findings, the existence of direct legislation campaigns may increase voter
participation, but also the variation in the intensity of those campaigns may produce variable
responses in terms of behavior. Some specific hypotheses can be tested using our data
on county-level signature gathering. For example: counties with more intense signature
campaigns may have higher turnout; counties with more intense campaigns may have lower
ballot roll-off rates (the difference between the number of ballots cast in a election and the
number of votes tabulated for each question on the ballot) for initiatives since voters in that
area may be more likely to have formed an opinion; more intense campaigns may produce
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different aggregate preferences on the measure. In this paper we focus on the second of these
by determining whether the intensity of signature gathering in a county influences ballot
roll-off.
Our dependent variable for this analysis is the proportion of voters in a county who
turned out to vote, but did not cast a vote on each of our eight ballot measures.29 On
average, nine percent of voters who cast a ballot abstain from voting on our each of our eight
ballot measures; Proposition 49 has the lowest rate at seven percent whereas Proposition 51
has the highest at eleven percent. The standard deviation in abstention rates across counties
is about 3.2%. To test whether the intensity of the signature gathering campaign for that
Proposition influences the roll-off rate in a county, we include a variable that measures the
intensity of the signature gathering effort in that county, Signatures Per Capita. More intense
campaigns correspond to a greater number of signatures per capita, leading us to predict a
negative relationship between intensity and roll-off.
In addition to our intensity measure, we include a variety of control variables for charac-
teristics including education, median age, income, race and ethnicity, density, partisanship
and competitiveness. Because our proposals were on four different ballots and because there
may have been features unique to each not captured by our control variables, we also include
a series of indicator variables for each proposal. Because our dependent variable is the pro-
portion of voters who abstained on specific measures, we estimate a grouped logit model.30
The results are presented in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
The grouped logit results are strong overall, with an R2 of 0.58. In addition, they provide
evidence in favor of our hypothesis: counties with more signatures per capita have a lower
roll-off rate. This provides evidence consistent with direct legislation as a means to increase
voter’s awareness of issues on upcoming ballots and demonstrates that there is an important
relationship between the signature gathering process and political behavior. In addition, it
indicates that direct legislation not only increases political activity at the state level, but that
variation in direct legislation campaigns within a state generate local variation in individual’s
19
responses.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides an empirical investigation into the process of signature gathering for
initiatives. For scholars and critics of the direct legislation process, these results provide
a first look at the consequences of the strategies of signature gatherers for the representa-
tiveness of petition signers. At the aggregate level, our results show a remarkable equity in
the geographic distribution of signatures relative to population. Yet we also find pervasive
evidence that a host of social and political factors are related to the signature gathering
process, suggesting that the answer is more nuanced than suggested by the aggregate data.
It is also important to observe that the pattern of signatures is extremely consistent across
all eight petitions that we analyze. Not only do the same factors matter for determining the
number of signatures gathered, but they operate in the same direction in every case. This
suggests that petition gatherers engage in little targeting across measures, either ideologically
or socially. Of course, this type of activity may happen at a more local level than used in
our analysis. This suggests that the ability to qualify an initiative may not depend strongly
on its issue content, but is almost entirely determined by the ability to pay for sufficient
signatures as the common wisdom suggests.
These findings may have implications for concerns about the importance of distribution
requirements. In some states these requirements have been ruled unconstitutional since they
effectively provide greater influence for voters in smaller counties. Since California has no
such requirement and our results indicate no undue reliance on large population centers
such as Los Angeles, the effect of distribution requirements can only be distortionary in
the sense that they would produce an over-reliance on smaller counties. In addition, our
examination of a hypothetical distribution requirement indicates that only the most onerous
of requirements would have inhibited our initiatives from qualifying, even ignoring the fact
that they were oblivious to our counterfactual experiment.
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While our analysis does reveal an equitable distribution of signatures on average, we
also find a fair amount of variation in the number of signatures gathered in similarly sized
counties, as evidenced by the Gini indices and the results of our regression analyses. Petition
managers or signature gatherers appear to place a greater emphasis on counties comprised
of potentially disaffected and disinterested voters, rather than find counties with ideological
and partisan profiles that are likely to fit well with the specific issue content of each measure.
This conclusion is based on the pattern of relationships found in our regression analyses:
counties that produce more signatures are younger, bigger, denser and with a larger black
population. These factors correspond to disaffected citizens who are typically less likely to be
politically active. These counties may be targeted either because voters may be less trustful
of elected officials or, more cynically, they may be more likely to sign petitions without much
reflection or objection. In addition, we also find more signatures from counties that vote
Republican and are more competitive. As California politics has been dominated by the
Democratic party in recent years, signature gatherers may feel that Republican voters are
more likely to sign petitions because they fell that the current constellation of control does
not sufficiently represent their interests.
Our results for signature validity are less consistent, though there is evidence of higher
invalidity rates in denser counties and counties with greater proportions of blacks and higher
unemployment rates. The strong and consistent effect of unemployment may be capturing
the effect of other, correlated variables (e.g., it may be related to mobility which increases
the chances of a signature not matching the address on the official registration rolls) or it
may be influencing the quality of signature gatherers that may be contracted to work locally.
This may be a case where further analysis and field interviews may help elucidate the exact
relationship.
Last, we examined one way in which signature gathering campaigns could influence the
eventual election outcome on each of the different ballot measures in our study. We specif-
ically focused on the impact of signature gathering activities on the relative roll-off rates
for each ballot measures, and we found that the more signatures gathered in a county, the
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lower the eventual roll-off rate. This is just one way in which signature gathering activities
might influence ballot measure campaigns and voting behavior, and this should be a subject
of future research.
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Notes
1Arguments on one side suggest that the initiative process is dominated by wealthy business interests
(Broder 2000; Ellis 2002; Schrag 1998; Smith 1998); arguments on the other side observe that money is rarely
enough to successfully pass an initiative and that the benefits of the process still accrue mainly to broader-
based citizen groups (Boehmke 2002, 2003; Donovan, Bowler, McCuan and Fernandez 1998; Ernst 2001;
Gerber 1999).
2Some distribution requirements are based on other political regions, including state electoral districts or
Congressional districts.
3An excellent extended discussion of signature gathering and the issues surrounding it is contained in
Ellis (2003). Briefer discussions are contained in Broder (2000); Cronin (1989); Ellis (2002); Magelby (1984);
and Tolbert, Lowenstein and Donovan (1998).
4Oregon first attempted to ban them in 1909; WA, SD and OH banned them about five years later. These
bans were stricken down by the Supreme Court ruling in Meyer v. Grant in 1988 (Ellis 2003).
5In fact, one circulator admitted that people were more likely to sign if he told them it was his birthday
(Ellis 2003)
6Ed Koupal, originally quoted by California Journal and cited in Cronin (1989).
7See Lowenstein and Stern (1989) for an extended discussion of this decision.
8Other forms of direct legislation in California include the referendum and recall, both of which require
a certain number of signatures be gathered. While the process is almost certainly the same, in this paper
we focus on the far more common statutory and constitutional measures.
9Originally, this requirement was 8%, but was dropped in 1966 due to flagging usage.
10A typical distribution requirement exists in Nebraska, where a five percent signature requirement must
be met in at least two-fifths of its counties.
11In cases where there are less than five hundred total signatures submitted, all are checked.
12As a potentially interesting aside, the files we received from the Secretary of State’s office indicate that
(at least for some petitions) as many as twenty-five counties did not generate their own random numbers for
the sampling procedure, rather these numbers were supplied by the Secretary of State’s office.
13Between 2000 and 2003, there were six initiative constitutional amendments that made it to the ballot;
we have data for four of these six measures (we lack data for Propositions 38 and 39 in the 2000 general
election). In this same period, there were five initiative statutes that made it to the ballot, of which we have
four; we did not receive data on Proposition 50 in the 2002 general election. Proposition 38 in the 2000
general election focused on school vouchers, while Proposition 39 regarded lowering the voting threshold for
school bonds to 55%. Proposition 38 failed to pass, receiving only 29.4% of yes votes, while Proposition 39
passed with 53.4% voting yes. Proposition 50 in the 2002 general election concerned water quality, water
projects, and wetland protection; this measure passed with 55.3% voting yes. We received this data as part
of research we were undertaking for another project, as in the course of communications with officials in
the Elections Division we learned that they retained some data on signature checks for some recent ballot
measures. We asked them to provide all of the data they had retained. We received a spreadsheet with data
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on the eight ballot measures, and only these eight. Expansion of this database, including more data from
earlier proposed ballot measures, is the subject of future research.
14And even if it did, no states have distribution requirements that require at least one signature from
every county (or district in some cases).
15If we exclude Los Angeles the correlation is 0.92 and the slope coefficient is 1.06. Obviously a linear
regression is not the best model to run; we use it for illustrative purposes only.
16We do not have random sample validation results for one initiative, though we do have the full sample
results for that case.
17This estimate is comparable to the rates obtained by the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office in a 1983
study. The petition circulated by professionals had a validity rate of 68% and the two petitions circulated
by volunteers had a validity rate of 84% (Lowenstein and Stern 1989).
18This average is the same even if we weight by county size.
19Firms also do their own internal validity checks to make sure they can meet their obligations.
20We performed a t-test for difference in means between the average percent valid for the two samples for
this one initiative, producing a t statistic of -6 (n=58).
21California Commission on Campaign Financing, quoted in Broder (2000).
22Of course, the absence of a distribution requirement in California means that signatures from one county
are just as valuable as signatures from any other county. There be little incentive to intentionally falsify
signatures because of this, however, there are documented instances where fraudulent signatures have been
submitted.
23Another possibility is that the variance is less than the mean, known as underdispersion. This case,
along with the other two (overdispersion and equidispersion) can simultaneously be estimated using King’s
generalized event count model (King 1989b). Our data exhibit overdispersion, so we use negative binomial
regression with constant overdispersion.
24The magnitude of the first differences varies mostly by whether the proposal is a statutory or consti-
tutional proposal. This is not because the variables matter more, it is because more signatures must be
gathered for the latter.
25The reason for including the natural logarithm follows from the model’s properties: if the expected
proportion of events is E[Y ]/Ymax, we can write E[Y ]/Ymax = exp(Xβ), so E[Y ] = exp(Xβ) ∗ Ymax =
exp(Xβ) ∗ exp(ln(Ymax)) = exp(Xβ + ln(Ymax)).
26The number of observations decreases in a couple of cases because some counties did not have entries
for the sample validity results.
27In addition to the negative binomial model reported, we also ran a grouped logit analysis, which produced
very similar results in term of sign and significance.
28An additional variable that we were unable to include would be the proportion of signatures gathered
by volunteers versus professionals. Unlike California, Oregon requires circulators to report this figure. The
Ohio Secretary of State’s study and statements by professional circulators suggest that volunteers have a
lower invalidity rate (Ellis 2003; Lowenstein and Stern 1989).
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29These data are available on the California Secretary of State’s website: http://www.ss.ca.gov.
30See Greene (1993) or Maddala (1983) for more information on grouped logit (also referred to minimum
logit chi-square method).
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Table 1: Descriptive Information on Ballot Measure Petitions
Petition Measure
Number Number Description Election Yes Vote
830 35 Public works projects: Use of private 2000 General 55.2
contracts for engineering and architectural
services. Initiative constitutional amendment
and statute
865 36 Drugs. Probation and treatment program. 2000 General 60.9
Initiative statute
874 37 Fees: Vote requirements. Taxes. 2000 General 47.9
Initiative constitutional amendment
918 45 Legislative term limits. Local voter 2002 Primary 42.3
petitions. Initiative constitutional amendment
935 51 Transportation: Distribution of existing 2002 General 42.2
motor vehicle sales and use taxes.
Initiative statute
936 52 Election day registration. Voter fraud 2002 General 40.9
penalties. Initiative statute
952 49 Before and after school programs. 2002 General 56.7
State Grants. Initiative statute
933 54 Classification by race, ethnicity or color, 2003 Recall 36.1
or national origin. Initiative constitutional
amendment
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates for Number of Invalid Signatures in Full
Checks by County
All 830 933
ln(Number of Signatures) 1.07 ∗ ∗ 1.06 ∗ ∗ 1.09 ∗ ∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Population Density 0.52 ∗ ∗ 0.66 ∗ ∗ 0.33∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.19)
Total population −0.38 ∗ ∗ −0.42 ∗ ∗ −0.32∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17)
Median Age −7.02 −2.21 −21.89
(17.32) (23.60) (19.33)
Percent Black 0.08 0.12 0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Percent Hispanic 0 0 0
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Percent Completed HS −0.23 −0.43 0.4
(1.16) (1.54) (1.42)
Percent Unemployed 4.16 ∗ ∗ 5.01 ∗ ∗ 3.84 ∗ ∗
(1.41) (1.97) (1.69)
Per capita income 0.12 0 0.24
(0.26) (0.28) (0.31)
Democrat Vote for Governor 0.29 0.4 0.24
(0.21) (0.29) (0.25)
Margin in Gov. Race 0.18 −0.02 0.35
(0.21) (0.24) (0.30)
Constant −2.13 ∗ ∗ −2.11∗ −2.17 ∗ ∗
(0.78) (1.18) (0.97)
Dispersion 36.65 32.12 29.27
SE 7.43 7.77 9.41
χ211 62821 33765 38970
p 0 0 0
Observations 115 58 57
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ Significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% level.
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Table 7: Grouped Logit Regression Estimates for Ballot Roll-Off by County
Signatures per Capita −0.26 ∗ ∗
(0.11)
Percent Unemployed −2.12
(1.62)
Percent Completed HS 0.80
(1.04)
Percent Hispanic 0.01
(0.03)
Percent Black 0.02
(0.05)
Per capita income −0.28
(0.36)
Population Density 0.28 ∗ ∗
(0.10)
Median Age −40.38 ∗ ∗
(11.46)
Democrat Vote for Governor 1.44 ∗ ∗
(0.21)
Margin in Governor’s Race −0.49 ∗ ∗
(0.18)
Petition 865 0.25 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Petition 874 0.18 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Petition 918 −0.15 ∗ ∗
(0.05)
Petition 933 −0.26 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Petition 935 0.21 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Petition 936 −0.14 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Petition 952 −0.23 ∗ ∗
(0.04)
Constant −1.68 ∗ ∗
(0.71)
Observations 464
R2 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ Significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at
5% level.
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